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JOINT TRIALS: JUDICIAL
INEFFICIENCY?
Pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, a prosecutor may join two or more defendants in the same
indictment.' Joinder requires an allegation that the defendants
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). The rule provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defend-
ants need not be charged in each count.
Id. See Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1959) (joinder permissible
where parties alleged to have participated in same act which constitutes offense).
Joinder was created out of common law. See, e.g., Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d
90, 94 (9th Cir. 1966) (Rule 8(b) was substantially a codification of existing law), cert denied,
393 U.S. 824 (1968); FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 advisory committee's note (Rule 8 is substantially
restatement of pre-existing law).
Most states have adopted comparable provisions to Rule 8(b). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1098 (Deering 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 111-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. Rule 6.20 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); N.Y. CRIM. PRoC. LAW § 200.40 (Mc-
Kinney 1990); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02 (Vernon 1974).
The rule governing joinder has been broadly interpreted. See United States v. Davis, 773
F.2d 1180, 1181 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("rule is broadly construed in favor of initial joinder");
United States v. Scott, 659 F.2d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1981) (broad construction of Rule 8
favoring initial joinder), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d
1354, 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Rule 8(b) should be construed broadly in favor of initial join-
der"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981); United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344
(9th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nor., Jacob v. United States, 404 U.S.
958 (1971).
Joinder is expressly permitted under FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) even though not every de-
fendant is charged with every offense in the indictment; the test is whether all charges
arose out of the "same series of acts or transactions." See United States v. Deckle, 768 F.2d
1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 649 (11th Cir.
1984) (same). Rule 8(b) however, leaves undefined what is meant by "the same series of
acts or transactions." Id. Clearly, similarity alone is not enough. A "series" is something
more than "similar" acts. King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1966). See also United
States v. Diaz-Munoz, 632 F.2d 1330, 1336 (5th Cir. 1980) (similarity in participation of
two defendants is insufficient); United States v. Marionneaux, 514 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th
Cir. 1975) ("Where ... there is no substantial identity of facts or participants," Rule 8(b)
joinder is improper.); United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 827-28 (1st Cir. 1973).
Many courts find that if the acts were part of a common scheme or plan, or connected
together, they can be regarded as a series. See, e.g., United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667,
673 (4th Cir.) (phrase "series of acts or transactions" logically includes transactions so in-
terconnected in time, place, and manner as to constitute common scheme or plan), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1978). Thus, joinder of a conspiracy count and substantive counts
arising out of the conspiracy is permitted since the claim of conspiracy provides a common
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"have participated in the same act or transaction or series of acts
or transactions. '  Once charged together, defendants invariably
are tried together.3 Typically, the trial judge defers to the "gov-
link and deinonstrates the existence of a common scheme or plan. E.g., United States v.
Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.) (conspiracy count provides common link with allegations
of mail and wire fraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); United States v. Kopituk, 690
F.2d 1289, 1314 (11 th Cir.) (tax offenses part of series of acts committed in furtherance of
conspiracy), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1982); United States v. DeLeon, 641 F.2d 330, 337
(5th Cir. 1981) (conspiracy count provides common link with substantive offense of intent
to distribute cocaine). Cf. United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971)
(government cannot add conspiracy count merely to link all defendants; joinder permissible
only where conspiracy charge is put forth in good faith). For the history of the drafting of
Rule 8, see Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26 F.R.D. 23-29 (1961).
I FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1960) (separate
substantive charges of indictment used identical language and violations of same criminal
statute making proof of scheme competent as to all counts); United States v. Harrelson,
754 F.2d 1153, 1176-77 (5th Cir.) (propriety of joinder determined by initial allegation),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
A prosecutor is entitled to charge and join parties in an indictment based on what he
reasonably anticipates proving. See United States v. Cook, 99 F.R.D. 252 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(presume prosecutor acting in good faith and evidence will demonstrate joinder proper).
The allegations of the indictment are then accepted as true by the court; joinder is denied
only upon demonstration by defendant of specific and compelling prejudice. Harrelson, 754
F.2d at 1176; United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1016 (5th Cir.) (allegations of indict-
ment accepted as true making joinder proper; severance then becomes matter of trial court
discretion under Rule 14), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1981). When during the course of a
trial, these allegations turn out to be baseless in light of the proof actually developed, the
joint trial will nevertheless continue. Schaffer, 362 U.S. at 515 (joinder proper even though
count dismissed because original allegations of indictment met explicit provisions of 8(b),
and facial sufficiency is all that is required); United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 299 (2d
Cir.) (where count justifying joinder is dismissed, severance will not be granted unless de-
fendant prejudiced by joinder on dismissed count not alleged in good faith), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 833 (1967). Consequently, the courts have read an implied condition into Rule
8(b) that the prosecutor make the requisite allegation in good faith. E.g., Cook, 99 F.R.D. at
254; United States v. Kaufman, 311 F.2d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 1963) (dismissal of conspiracy
count not ground for severance absent bad faith on part of government); United States v.
Manfredi, 275 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.) (when defendant claims conspiracy charge made in
bad faith, must move for a mistrial), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 928 (1960).
Some courts have held that 8(b) requirements have been met when it was clear the de-
fendants had participated in the same transaction even though the indictment failed to
allege it. See United States v. Serubo, 460 F. Supp. 689, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (absence of
"connecting" allegation from indictment not dispositive; government representations made
in other pretrial proceedings and documents as to factual connections between counts may
satisfy 8(b) requirements); United States v. Florio, 315 F. Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(even if indictment does not sufficiently allege a "series of acts" joining defendants, requi-
site nexus may be supplied by bill of particulars).
Misjoinder under Rule 8 is a question of law, reviewable on appeal. See United States v.
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 n.12 (1986) (Supreme Court in 5-4 decision resolved split among
circuits, holding that "harmless error" doctrine applied to cases of misjoinder). But cf.
United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1467 (1 1th Cir. 1987) ("misjoinder under Rule
8(b) is prejudicial per se").
' See United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 919 (8th Cir.) (strong policy in favor of
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ernment's charging strategy of maximum joinder,"" since it is be-
lieved to promote economical and efficient judicial
administration.
joint trial where defendants are alleged to have participated in same act or transaction or
in same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 980 (1985); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 991 (1981); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979); United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1978)
(same); United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States
v. Gambrill, 449 F.2d 1148, 1159 (D.D.C. 1971) (defendants jointly charged are to be
jointly tried); Note, Harmless Error and Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 536 n.14 (1978) (for defend-
ant going to trial properly joined under Rule 8, chances of receiving a separate trial at
later date unlikely at the trial level and even less likely on appeal).
A joint trial may be ordered by the court, even absent a joint charge by the prosecutor.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 13. Rule 13 provides:
The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried
together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same
as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
Id. The propriety of joinder of indictments for trial under Rule 13 is determined by refer-
ence to Rule 8. See Molatkofski v. United States, 179 F.2d 905, 909 (1st Cir. 1950) (defend-
ants could have been joined under Rule 8(b); therefore court authorized by Rule 13 to try
defendants together). See also Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir.) (Rules
8(b) and 13 designed to promote efficiency and to avoid multiplicity of trials), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 964 (1956).
" Federal Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Proposal Concerning
Problems Created By Extremely Long Criminal Trials, 5 (1989). Prosecutors favor joining de-
fendants. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1989)
(indictment charged 35 defendants with 15 counts), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990);
United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir.) (indictment charged 33 defendants
with 40 counts), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 942 (1977); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720,
727 (2d Cir. 1965) (20 defendants charged with 160 counts), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947
(1966); United States v. Agnello, 367 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (23 defendants
charged on 14 counts). The courts traditionally have recognized a strong presumption
against splitting up an indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 748
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-210 (1987).
Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system .... Many joint trials ...
involve a dozen or more codefendants .... It would impair both the efficiency and
the fairness of the criminal justice system to require, in all these cases of joint crimes
• . . that prosecutors bring separate proceedings .... Joint trials generally serve the
interests of justice by avoiding [the inequity of] inconsistent verdicts [while] enabling
[a] more accurate assessment of relative culpability.
Id. Furthermore, joint trials tend to conserve judicial resources, alleviate burdens imposed
on citizens serving as jurors, and avoid reiteration of testimony by witnesses in a series of
trials. But see United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1970) (governmental
economy not an appropriate consideration for justification of joinder), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 946 (1971); United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (judicial
economy and prompt trial of accused must be weighed against unfairness to defendant),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963).
These policy considerations are particularly important since the "government and the
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Proper joinder, nevertheless, may be prejudicial to a defend-
ant.' Recognizing this, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which is entitled "Relief From Prejudicial Joinder,"
grants a court discretionary power to order severance of defend-
ants, charges, or both, upon a showing of prejudice to a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.7 The defendant must show substantial
courts have been placed under strict mandate to expedite criminal trials." United States v.
Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)
(7) (recognizing that joinder of defendants potentially delays a trial).
I See United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.) (bias inherent in joint
trial), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933 (1986); United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655,
(1 th Cir.) ("Inherent in every joint trial is, of necessity, some degree of bias"; so an excep-
tion to general rule of joinder exists where defendant is subject to undue prejudice), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1980)
(notwithstanding inherent prejudice in joint trials, showing of compelling prejudice is re-
quired for severance); United States v. Sanders, 563 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1977) (even if
joinder of two or more defendants is technically proper, relief from joinder may be neces-
sary if specific prejudice is claimed to arise from the joint trial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020
(1978).
The advantages of a joint trial must be balanced against a defendant's right to a fair
trial. United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (joinder initially
proper but complexity of case has prejudicial impact on defendants warranting severance).
See United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 839 (7th Cir.) (determination must be made
"whether it is within the jury's capacity, given the complexity of the case, to follow admon-
itory instructions and to keep separate, collate and appraise the evidence relevant only to
each defendant."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967). See also United States v. Hedman,
630 F.2d 1184, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
Id. See United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 492 (2d Cir. 1984) (Rule 14 affords trial court
wide discretion to warrant severance), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985); United States v.
Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir.) (severance denied at the "broad discretion of trial
judge"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1129-
30 (2d Cir.) (severance "within the broad discretion of the trial judge and will not be over-
turned on appeal absent some showing of substantial prejudice. ... ), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980).
Severance may be sought by the government or the defendant. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2d § 221 at 774 (1982). However, the government's
controlling position with regard to drafting the indictment and joining the defendants and
offenses renders a prosecutor's motion unlikely. Id. But see United States v. Erullon, 482 F.
Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (government's motion for severance granted).
By definition, Rule 14 comes into play only if the original joinder was proper..See 1 C.
WRIGHT, supra, § 221 at 769; United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1983)
(threshold inquiry to determine severance is whether joinder initially proper); United
States v. Rogers, 636 F. Supp. 237, 241 (D.C. Colo. 1986) (same).
If a motion under Rule 14 is made before trial, the court may delay an appraisal of the
danger of prejudice until more information is available. See United States v. Holman, 490
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prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, Rule 14
places a heavy burden on the defendant.' When denied, severance
is reversible on appeal only if an abuse of discretion is shown.9
F. Supp. 755, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (decision regarding severance must await trial); United
States v. Olin Corp. 465 F. Supp. 1120, 1129-30 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant free to re-
new motion for severance later in trial). Even if the motion is properly denied when first
made, the court has a continuing duty to grant a severance if prejudice appears through
later events or developments at trial. See Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516
(1960) (trial judge should be sensitive to possibility of prejudice developing).
B See United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir.) (severance motion de-
nied absent showing of substantial prejudice amounting to miscarriage of justice), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Shipp v. United States, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985); United States v. Sotomayor,
592 F.2d 1219, 1227 (2d Cir.) (severance denied due to insufficient showing that defendant
would have better chance for acquittal at separate trial), cert. denied sub nom. Crespo v.
United States, 442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d
Cir. 1978) (severance denied because defendants failed to carry burden of showing substan-
tial prejudice).
Substantial prejudice may result from (1) antagonistic or mutually exclusive defenses, (2)
a codefendant with exculpatory testimony who is unwilling to testify in a joint trial due to
the potential for self incrimination, or (3) introduction of a codefendant's out of court
statements if they would incriminate the defendant and leave the defendant without the
opportunity to cross examine the codefendant. See United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188,
195 (1st Cir. 1980) (severance on ground of conflicting defense denied because defendant
failed to demonstrate conflict was so prejudicial that defenses are irreconcilable).
A defendant moving for severance to obtain favorable testimony from a codefendant
"must show (1) a bona fide need for the testimony; (2) the substance of the [desired] testi-
mony; (3) [the] exculpatory nature and effect [of the testimony]; and (4) that the codefend-
ant would in fact testify" at a severed trial. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1084
(5th Cir. 1987) (severance motion denied because defendant merely made conclusory state-
ments regarding exculpatory nature of desired testimony). Once a defendant makes a
threshold showing, the court must (1) examine the significance of the testimony in relation
to defendant's theory of the case; (2) assess the extent of prejudice against absence of the
testimony; (3) weigh the benefits of judicial administration and economy; and (4) consider
the timeliness of the motion. See United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1544 (11 th Cir.
1986) (severance motion denied desired testimony which would not significantly advance
defendant's theory). Cf. United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, amended by 777 F.2d
543 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendants not entitled to severance on ground that they wished to
testify on one count and not all counts).
' See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449-502 n.12 (1986) (appellant must demon-
strate that court's abuse of discretion caused substantial prejudice); Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) (whether defendants' should be tried together or severally is within
sound discretion of trial judge); United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir.)
(reversal of denied motion to sever granted only upon showing trial judge clearly abused
his discretion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988). See also United States v. Carpentier, 689
F.2d 21, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928-29 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983)). If the denial of severance motion causes some
prejudice, but less than substantial prejudice, the court is not apt to reverse and will instead
retain joinder and promote judicial efficiency. Id.
A defendant's claim that his acquittal would have been more probable is insufficient to
find error in denying severance. See, e.g., United States v. Garver, 809 F.2d 1291, 1298
(7th Cir. 1987) (defendant's showing of probable chance for acquittal in separate trial is
insufficient to overcome general rule that defendants indicted together should be tried to-
325
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 321, 1990
However, considering the infrequency with which severance is
granted, 0 Rule 14 is perhaps more aptly entitled "No Relief
From Prejudicial Joinder."'" Recently, however, as the number,
size, length and complexity of trials have continued to increase,12
resulting in "mega-trials", 18 courts have begun to question the ra-
gether); United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant must show
joined trials were more than burden on chances of acquittal); United States v. Bullock, 451
F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
Courts consider several factors in determining whether severance is appropriate. See, e.g.,
United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (possible prejudice from type
of evidence to be admitted against other defendants); United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d
881, 887 (2d Cir. 1968) (number of counts and defendants), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029
(1969); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965) (disparities in quantum of
proof offered against various defendants), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); United States
v. Gilbert, 504 F. Supp. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (apparent relative culpability of
defendants).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1294 (5th Cir.) (to demonstrate abuse
of discretion on appeal defendant must demonstrate "that the denial of severance caused
him to suffer compelling prejudice") (citing United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). Compelling
prejudice is not found when the evidence against one codefendant is more damaging than
the evidence against another. See, e.g., United States v. Magee, 821 F.2d 234, 243 (5th Cir.
1987) (no compelling prejudice found when testimony of codefendants was presented);
United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268, 272-73 (5th Cir.) (no compelling prejudice found
when codefendant offered large number of witnesses in complicated case), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 858 (1987); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1987) (no com-
pelling prejudice found in tax and narcotics charges when evidence of codefendant's
wealth supported existence of heroin distribution conspiracy); United States v. Mabry, 809
F.2d 671, 682 (10th Cir.) (no compelling prejudice found merely from overwhelming evi-
dence against codefendant), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874 (1987). See also United States v.
Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (8th Cir. 1987) ("specter of guilt by association" with code-
fendant insufficient to warrant severance).
" Walsh, Fair Trials and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 49 A.B.A. J. 853, 856
(1963) ("might as well be entitled 'No Relief From Prejudicial Joinder'" because judge
"may" decide prejudice). See also Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants In Criminal Cases: An
Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1379, 1410 (1979). "Reluctance to
grant severance . . . grows in part from the many procedural difficulties of moving for
severance." Id. "There is no good time to assert prejudicial joinder." Id. "Asserting it
before trial is speculative; asserting it during trial is disruptive; and asserting it on appeal
invites hindsight deeming the error harmless." Id.
1" See, e.g., United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir.) (40 charges against 22
defendants), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 125
(5th Cir. 1976) (10 charges against 23 defendants), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977);
United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir. 1974) (conspiracy charge against 24
defendants), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 820
(2d Cir. 1962) (30 charges against 10 defendants), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 259 (1963). See
generally Moss, Mega-Trials: Risks and Rewards, 74 A.B.A. J. 74, 75 (March 1988) (discussing
growth of trial complexity).
1" See Moss, Mega-Trials, supra note 12, at 75. A mega-trial is "one which has several
defendants, several counts, and charges a variety of criminal conduct." Id. at 74-75. "Any
trial lasting longer than a month or two is usually a mega-trial." Id. "A mega-trial is when
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tionale of traditional justifications underlying mass trials.1' In
United States v. Casamento,'6 more popularly known as "The Pizza
Connection Case," the district court presided over a joint trial
which included twenty-one defendants, involved the testimony of
over 275 witnesses, thousands of exhibits, over forty thousand
pages of transcripts, and lasted seventeen months.16 Motions for
severance were denied by the trial court." On appeal, the Second
Circuit rejected the defendants' contentions that the denial of sev-
erance resulted in a denial of due process. 18 While affirming the
district court's decision, Judge Pierce, writing for the court,
strongly implied that the traditional practices of joinder and sev-
erance need reexamination in light of modern realities.' 9 In an
effort to limit cases to a manageable size, the court set forth three
"benchmarks" to be used by the prosecution and the trial judges
to determine when joinder or severance is proper."0 The court
the 'Seven Santini Brothers' deliver the indictment, and it takes an entire wagon train to
deliver the discovery." (statement of David Lewis, Esq.) Id. at 75.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989) (court has
"misgivings" in joint trial of 21 defendants, 16 counts), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990);
United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 753-754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("we question the tradi-
tional assumption that denial of severance in cases such as this promotes efficiency" and is
necessarily in best interests of justice), af'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988). See generally Fed-
eral Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, supra note 4, at 5; Weinfeld, The
Problems of Long Criminal Trials, 34 F.R.D. 155, 158 (1963) (discussing complexity of trial
involving multiple defendants).
The original intent of Rule 14 was to prevent the injustice of mass trials. See United
States v. Gaston, 37 F.R.D. 476, 477 (D.D.C. 1965) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff,
member of Advisory Committee that drafted Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). "It
was the purpose of the Committee to make it possible for federal judges to prevent a mass
trial, because a mass trial is contrary to the basic principles of our jurisprudence." Id. at
477. See also 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 223 at 811 (case law gives no confident feeling
that purpose achieved); Moss, Mega-Trials, supra note 12, at 75 (approximately 50 mega-
trials have been held in total in New York within the last three years alone; two dozen
prosecutions lasting more than 3 months have been brought).
'" 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990). Prosecution
charged defendants with 16 counts, involving international conspiracy of narcotics distribu-
tion, with the proceeds from the sale of these narcotics being scattered among various
pizza parlors. Id. at 1147-49.
14 Id. at 1149.
11 United States v. Badalamenti, 663 F. Supp. 1542, 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affid sub
no=., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1138 (1990).
"s Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1151.
' Id. at 1151-53.
s Unites States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 1 10
S. Ct. 1138 (1990). The court presented three benchmarks as follows:
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clearly indicated that, although multi-defendant trials promote ju-
dicial economy, there is a point at which the inherent prejudice
outweighs the desired benefits. 1
This Note will explore the traditional concepts regarding join-
der, and the benefits derived therefrom. It will then examine the
shortcomings of a "mega-trial," given its recent increase in com-
plexity, size and frequency of use. Furthermore, this Note will dis-
cuss the detrimental effects of mass trials on the criminal justice
system, the jury, and the defendants. Finally, in an effort to recon-
cile the objectives of joint trials with modern reality, this Note will
suggest reforms that will promote the fair and economical admin-
istration of justice.
I. THE LAW OF DIMINISHING RETURNS AS APPLIED TO JOINDER
The law of diminishing returns states that as successive units of
a variable resource are added to the production process, output
will initially increase rapidly, but then it will level off and ulti-
mately decrease.22 It is submitted that this rudimentary economic
First, the district judge should elicit from the prosecutor a good faith estimate of the
time reasonably anticipated to present the government's case .... [Tihe judge need
not accept the estimate without question but should be free to make an independent
assessment based on various factors including the number of defendants, the time
and territorial scope of the crimes charged, the number of witnesses likely to be
called, and size of exhibits likely to be introduced, including wiretaps.
In those cases where the judge determines that the time for presentation of the
prosecution's case will exceed four months, the judge should oblige the prosecutor
to present a reasoned basis to support a conclusion that a joint trial of all the defend-
ants is more consistent with the fair administration of justice than some manageable
division of the case into separate trials for groups of defendants. In determining
whether the prosecutor has made an adequate showing, the judge should weigh the
interests of the prosecution, the defendants, the jurors, the court, and the public.
Finally, in assessing the appropriate number of defendants for any trial in which
the prosecution's case is likely to require more than four months to present, the
judge should oblige the prosecutor to make an especially compelling justification for
a joint trial of more than ten defendants.
ld.
21 Id. at 1151 (court noted benefits of multi-defendant trials, but also recognized evident
disadvantages which can occur at trial).
' See C. AMMER & D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 118 (1977) (di-
minishing returns principle seeks to establish a relationship between the additional output
attributed to an increase in variable factors such as labor or capital). See generally P. GEM-
MILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS 36-48 (6th ed. 1960) (discussion of theory of diminish-
ing return) [hereinafter GEMMILL]; W. CURTIS, MICROECONOMICS CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS
26-27 (1984) [hereinafter CURTIS] (to achieve maximum output efficiency resources there is
328
Joint Trials
principle is applicable to judicial trials. Simply stated, joint trials
are beneficial to a point,23 after which they become increasingly
detrimental, resulting in unreasonably protracted trials and un-
warranted burdens on all of the parties concerned.2 '
II. TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF JOINT TRIALS
It is widely accepted that joint trials are more efficient 26 and
a limit to the proportions).
The use of fertilizer treatment per acre and corn production can illustrate. See CURTIS, at
26-27. On a tract of land where corn is grown, initially, more corn can be grown if more
fertilizer (a variable input) is used. Id. The affect of the fertilizer use will continue until a
point is reached where no additional corn will grow. Id. If more fertilizer is added, beyond
this point, corn production will start to decrease. Id. Generally speaking, the point of di-
minishing return is reached when the addition of resources becomes detrimental to the
manufacturing entity. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDAUS, ECONOMICS 34 (12 ed. 1983). To fur-
ther illustrate, output, as a function of varying inputs, can be depicted graphically. Id.
Economists separate the graph into three areas: the first area shows output progressively
increasing; the second area depicts the output as still increasing, but at a decreasing rate;
the third area represents declining output. See CURTis, at 28-29. The point at which output
starts to decrease is called the point of diminishing returns. See GEMMILL, at 39. This point
represents the amount of input resources that affords the most efficient use of the fixed
variables. See CURTIS, at 29. The authors submit that this basic economic principle applies
in the context of a joint trial, where the number of defendants, the number of counts, and
the underlying subject matter of the trial would all be variables affecting the efficiency of a
court. Cf GEMMILL at 41-43.
23 See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987). "Joint trials generally serve the
interests of justice .. " Id. There is a consensus that joint trials conserve judicial resources
by saving manpower and time. See, e.g., United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 733 (2d
Cir.) (public interest served by avoiding "unnecessarily multiplicitous [sic] litigation"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1970)
(joint trials conserve judicial resources), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971); United States v.
Gilbert, 504 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (severance not required in a six week trial).
" Cf CURTIS, supra note 22, at 30-32 (after point of diminishing returns surpassed, one
experiences increased costs and decreased productivity resulting in inefficiency). Regarding
the judicial system, it is submitted that inefficiency can be characterized as the unnecessary
employment of judicial resources and the amplification of prejudices towards the defend-
ants. Cf Dawson, supra note 11, at 1409-49 (discussing prejudice of joint-trial); Weinfeld,
The Problems of Long Criminal Trials, 34 F.R.D. 155, 208-10 (1963) (discussing observations
of benching long cases). Although not expressly attributing problems caused by mass trials
to their size, courts have recognized some limitations to joinder. See, e.g., United States v.
DePalma, 466 F. Supp. 920, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (joint trials are inappropriate if a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial is compromised); United States v. Ong, 397 F. Supp. 385, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (severance should not be granted unless defendant can show it will deny
him a fair trial).
" See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) ("joint trials are more economi-
cal and minimize the burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and courts"); United States v.
Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir.) (joint trials reduce burdens on witnesses, expen-
diture of judicial and prosecutorial time), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987); United States v.
Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1970) ("general rule" in favor of joint trial "conserves
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more economical than severed trials.2' Further, the common wis-
dom is that joint trials avoid inconsistent verdicts and present the
jury with an "overall picture" of the criminal act.2 7
A. The Presumed Prosecutorial Efficiency
Joinder can be more efficient than severed trials because it saves
the prosecutor from presenting duplicative evidence in separate
trials.28 This assumption is supported by the underlying belief that
the evidence relating to each defendant is virtually identical and
results from the same act or series of acts.2 9 Generally, a conspir-
judicial resources, alleviates the burdens on citizens serving as jurors, and avoids the neces-
sity of having witnesses reiterate testimony in a series of trials."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946
(1971).
" See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (Court noted "joint trials con-
serve state funds...") (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968)). See also
United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y 1962), afftd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963). Rule favoring joint trials serves public interest "in
avoiding duplicitous, time-consuming and expensive trials" by promoting the "[elconomy
of judicial manpower and the prompt trial of those accused ..... Id.
"7 See, e.g., Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210 (joint trials serve interests of justice by "avoiding
inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability.");
United States v. Badalamenti, 663 F. Supp. 1542, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[i]t was only by
putting together the voluminous results of such continuous surveillance that the circum-
stantial evidence fitted together like a crossword puzzle to show that defendants were in-
volved in a large-scale international conspiracy to import drugs"), aff d sub nom. United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990);
United States v. Santoro, 647 F. Supp. 153, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("joint trial permits jury
to see comprehensive presentation of the entire enterprise and the role played by each
participant. ... ) (quoting United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)), affd mem., 880 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 177.
"In criticizing... [lengthy, complex trials,] ... let us remember that they attempt to reach
the circumspect and subtle participant who cannot be convicted unless confronted with the
full impact of his highly organized activity." Id. (statement by Paul Windels, Jr. Esq.). In
some instances, "the illegality can be shown only by piecing together many transactions
which are individually lawful." Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. Moralis, 868 F.2d 1562, 1572 (11 th Cir. 1989) (court noted
separate trials would result in inefficient duplication of evidence); United States v.
Casamayor, 837 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting separate trials are an un-
economical duplication of evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989); Jervis v. Hall, 622
F.2d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1980) (prosecution argued, and court agreed, duplication of evi-
dence was uneconomical). See also Note, Project: Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Proce-
dure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 763, 774
(1989) (joint trials result in judicial economy); supra notes 5 and 25. But see Dawson, supra
note 11, at 1383 ("whether the trial is joint or individual affects only a small portion of the
prosecutor's investment of time").
*" See, e.g., United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1987) (defendants charged
with drug violations, racketeering, tax evasion, and false declarations to a grand jury prop-
erly joined because overlapping proof involved); United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500,
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acy charge will lead to a joinder of the defendants; however, un-
like traditional conspiracy cases, most "mega-trials" stem from de-
fendants' participation in a multi-faceted enterprise."0 Therefore,
the evidence against any one defendant may be diverse and unre-
lated to other defendants, making duplicitous proof less likely.3 1
Courts and commentators have recently suggested that sever-
ance is actually beneficial to the government because it diminishes
the overall trial time. 2 In mass trials, frequent adjournments are
502 (2d Cir. 1970) (traditional assumptions support joint trials "when indictment charges a
crime 'which may be proved against all the defendants by the same evidence and which
result from the same or a similar series of acts.' ") (quoting Unites States v. Kahaner, 203
F. Supp. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affid, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836
(1963)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 144, at 505. A
number of courts "permit joinder under Rule 8(b) only if the indictment invites joint
proof." Id. "The strongest case for ordering a joint trial is where the evidence to support
the charges against the several defendants is virtually identical." Id. § 213 at 766. But cf.
United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 366 (2d Cir.) ("differing levels of culpability and
proof are inevitable in any multi-defendant trial and, standing alone, are insufficient
grounds for separate trials"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983).
30 See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affid, 863 F.2d 185
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989). The gravamen of the traditional notion
of conspiracy was "the making [of] an agreement to commit a readily identifiable crime or
series of crimes . . . over a period of years." Id. In contrast, the gravamen of conspiracy
today is the existence of a "sufficient nexus to tie the various defendants and the diverse
predicate offenses together." Id. If one would apply pre-RICO concepts of conspiracy to
Gallo, it would most likely be that a single overreaching conspiracy could not be charged
based on the allegations. Id. See generally Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO: Expanding Tradi-
tional Conspiracy Law, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1983) (discusses differences between
traditional conspiracy law and law under RICO).
In order to effectively obtain a conviction under RICO, it is the government's burden to
prove the existence of an "enterprise" and a connected "pattern of racketeering activity"
which constitutes a series of criminal acts as defined by statute. See United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). Once a RICO conspiracy charge is made, joinder is
automatically authorized under Rule 8(b). See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118,
1129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
"1 See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989) (argument by
prosecution that evidence presented at joint trial would necessarily have to be presented at
all severed trials not borne out), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990); Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at
756 (conspiracy to participate in multi-faceted enterprise involves diverse and unrelated
forms - such being the "catch-all" nature of RICO). But see Schaffer v. United States, 362
U.S. 511, 515 (1960) (proof, although compartmentalized to each petitioner, was related to
all petitioners); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir.) (denial of severance
upheld even though only small percentage of total evidence directly against defendant,
when greater percentage of evidence showed nature of scheme in which defendant alleg-
edly was involved), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987).
" See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 757 (severed trials prevent evidence from being scattered);
United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 841 (2d Cir. 1962) (noted extra time involved when
necessary to represent multi-defendants in joint trial), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963). See
also United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1341 (2d Cir. 1974) (wiser to break up these
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caused by the necessity of requiring the multitude of parties and
their respective attorneys and witnesses to be present at a speci-
fied time and place.3 8 Severance of trials not only makes for fewer
continuances and adjournments, but also makes side bars less fre-
quent and allows the trial to move more rapidly "since only two or
three attorneys are cross examining and raising objections rather
than two or three dozen.""'
Additionally, in a series of several trials, the government may
benefit and overall trial time may decrease by the fact that subse-
quent trials will be shortened and often precluded as a result of an
earlier trial. 5 Subsequent trials will progress more rapidly since
the government will be more aware of which evidence is most
convincing to a jury, while the court, now more familiar with the
case, may rule more expeditiously and proficiently.36 Further, the
total number of severed trials may decrease since there is a
greater likelihood that defendants will plead guilty once they see
that the prosecution has secured convictions of other
defendants.3 7
huge cases - little time saved by government having prosecuted offenses in one rather than
two conspiracy trials), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 161
(separate trials help defendants get adequate representation).
" See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1385 (joint trials far more difficult to schedule; as num-
ber increases, it becomes harder to find date acceptable to court, prosecution, witnesses
and attorneys). See also Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755 (court cannot wait for all parties to be
available before trial date is set). Cf. United States v. Pineda, No. 81 Cr. 376-CSH, slip op.
at 26 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1982) (substantial delay in completing evidentiary hearing caused
by engagement of Pineda's counsel in long criminal trial); Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976) (congressional recognition that joinder of defendants causes
delay).
Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 757. See generally Agueci, 310 F.2d at 840-41. In Agued, the
court stated, with regard to restricting the number of defendants, that:
Each counsel, understandably in the mass-conspiracy case, makes a determined effort
... to distinguish his client from other defendants on trial; he often duplicates mat-
ter covered by other counsel, prolongs cross-examination by repetitiveness, becomes
more vigorous in his trial demeanor than might ordinarily be proper, and becomes
unduly adamant about trial technicalities.
Id.; Dawson, supra note 11, at 1387 (judge must expect many more objections from de-
fense attorneys in a joint trial).
86 See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[d]uplicative and
cumulative evidence becomes easier to identify and exclude ... conspiracies verified more
readily .. "), affd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989).
8 Id. "Each successive trial moves at a quicker and smoother pace." Id. See Weinfeld,
supra note 24, at 161 (government gains opportunity to learn from early mistakes; such
exposure may encourage pleas and sharpen later cases).
31 See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1389 (when cases severed, first trial may well be the
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B. The Presumed Witness Efficiency
Joinder can be more efficient since it lessens the burden im-
posed upon witnesses, who are spared the necessity, and perhaps
trauma, of giving testimony in a series of trials.38 Again, this as-
sumption is presupposed by the notion that the same evidence and
the same witnesses will be used against each defendant.3 9 Often
the contrary is true and the witnesses are not identical in "mega-
trials", where the defendant is an alleged participant in a multi-
faceted enterprise. Furthermore, for those situations where
there are common witnesses, they can be protected from multiple
appearances by stipulating necessary, but undisputed, noncritical
testimony." Moreover, it should be noted that most witnesses in a
criminal trial are not laypersons, but professionals such as prose-
cution investigators, lab employees and police officers, whose job
functions include testifying in court.4
2
only trial); Langrock, Joint Trials: A Short Lesson from Little Vermont, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 612,
616-17 (1973). The "domino theory" provides:
The verdict of the first defendant tried has a great deal of bearing on the disposition
of the other defendants charged with the same offense .... In a vast majority of the
cases, an initial conviction has induced the awaiting codefendant to negotiate a plea.
... Thus, the experience has been that a single trial of one defendant has resulted in
the disposition of almost all the charges stemming out of the single crime, and this
has occurred without the length of the joint trial and the attendant complications
that almost always go with such a trial.
Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972
(1979); United States v. Borelli, 435 F.2d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing witness inconve-
nience and safety as compelling factors favoring joint trials), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946
(1971); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); United
States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1411 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same). See also Parker v.
United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 n.4 (9th Cir. 1968) (particular attention should be paid
to witness who often is most burdened by a long trial, and most often forgotten), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969).
11 See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 758 (witness considerations decreased where severed trials
concern separate and independent evidence and witnesses); United States v. Sperling, 506
F.2d 1323, 1341 n.25 (2d Cir. 1974) (much wiser for government to try separately as there
were no common witnesses), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
'0 See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (need for duplica-
tive testimony negligible), affd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083
(1989); Sperling, 506 F.2d at 1341 n.25 (only one common witness against members of both
conspiracies).
"' See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1385. Stipulation could eliminate repeated testimony
regarding lab results. Id. Trial court could even condition severance on such stipulation in
appropriate circumstances. Id.
"" See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 758 (court makes distinction between federal law enforce-
ment agents as witnesses and civilian witnesses); Dawson, supra note 11, at 1384-85 (impor-
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C. The Consistent Verdict Justification
Other justifications advanced in support of joinder are that sev-
erance fosters inconsistent jury verdicts and unequal treatment of
legally indistinguishable defendants.43 Joint trials, on the other
hand, are more consistent and consequently more equitable in the
verdicts they deliver."" This "consistency-of-verdict" argument
fails, however, for the same reasons asserted in the efficiency ar-
gument."5 Because in a "mega-trial", by definition, the charges
against the defendants vary with the degree of involvement, mere
participants should be distinguished from the more culpable de-
fendants and are deserving of different treatment.""
D. The "Overall Picture" Justification
Finally, it is said that joinder provides the jury with the "big
picture" of the pattern and interrelationship of the complex of-
fenses. 47 Once the whole picture is before the jury, they can con-
tant to know whether testifying is part of their job when assessing inconvenience imposed
on witness).
" See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
majority should note separate trials cause varying consequences for each defendant). See
also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
"' See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 143 (White, J., dissenting) (unfairness of separate trials con-
firmed by "common prosecutorial experience of seeing codefendants who are tried sepa-
rately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to be
tried."); United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (if separate trials
must be held, then "defendants will be placed in unequal positions, with some gaining the
advantage of disclosure of the [g]overnment's case and the possibility of. . . fading memo-
ries making proof of the charge ever more difficult"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 268 F.2d
256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863 (1959). See also A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M.
MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 1-275 (3d ed. 1974) (prior
trial of codefendant allows defense counsel full discovery in advance of government's case;
alternatively, if first defendant is convicted, codefendant may turn state's evidence).
'" See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
48 See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (several defendants
here only peripherally involved and should not be burdened with stigma of those more
actively involved), affd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989);
United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (as to each of the defendants,
court must consider the "gross disparity in the quantity and venality" of the evidence), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984). See generally Note, Joinder and Severance, 27 How. L.J. 787,
789-96 (1984) (analysis of joinder issues).
41 See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 756 (government argues severance denies them opportunity
to present "big picture" to jury and consequently would hamper jurors' ability to under-
stand operation of enterprise); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (joint trial allows jury to see "comprehensive presentation" of entire enterprise and
role of each defendant).
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sider the full impact of the involvement of each defendant and
determine his relative culpability.'8 The jury's ability to judge the
relative culpability of each defendant is only as effective as its abil-
ity to compartmentalize the evidence relevant to each."9 In the
context of "mega-trials", however, there is a danger of jury con-
fusion and spill-over culpability, making this assumption
questionable.50
III. THE EQUITABLE COSTS OF MEGA-TRIALS
A. Equitable Costs of Joinder to the Judicial System
Joinder is purportedly more efficient than separate trials be-
cause it conserves judicial resources while minimizing the burdens
placed on a court and on a jury.51 This assumption is questionable
when one considers that the "mega-trial" often monopolizes a
court's calendar for the better part of a year. 52 The length and
"8 See supra notes 27 and 47. "[I]f you tried the ultimate principles out of the context of
their apparatus, the chances of conviction, as a practical matter, would be slim indeed."
Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 177 (1963) (statement of P. Windels, Jr., Esq.). But see Gallo,
668 F. Supp. at 756. The "overall view" argument neglects the fact that evidence used to
prove the "big picture" in a joint trial should be limited to only that evidence which would
be admitted at a trial of a single defendant. Id. If evidence would be excluded at the sev-
ered trial, it should be excluded as to that defendant in a joint trial. Id. Since the govern-
ment is not able to introduce unlimited "enterprise" evidence at individual trials of each
defendant, it cannot here. Id. at 757. Most notably, the "enterprise" evidence, used to
show the existence, structure and operations of the defendants and to present the "big
picture" and "overall view" to the jury, has taken only a few days. Id.; Dawson, supra note
11, at 1394 (overall view calls for evidence unrelated to defendant on trial and is therefore
unfairly prejudicial).
" See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (equitable costs to defendant).
See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text (equitable costs to defendant).
' Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968) ("Joint trials do conserve state
funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in
bringing those accused of crime to trial."); United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d
Cir. 1980) (policy underlying Rule 8 is "trial convenience and economy of judicial and
prosecutorial resources .. "). The judicial economy rationale is "itself based upon a pre-
sumption, lacking any empirical 'proof' that a single consolidated trial is superior to several
shorter trials." Federal Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, supra note 4, at
5. See also United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (assumption only
applicable to cases where all the evidence is admissible against all defendants), affd, 863
F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989). But see Dawson, supra note 11,
at 1390 (assumption of judicial economy is not supported by empirical data).
5 See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 754 (noting some trials take well over one year, with compa-
rable time spent on pre-trial matters). The assumed efficiency of consolidated trials should
not go unquestioned in mega-trials. Id. See also United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323,
1341 n.25 (2d Cir. 1974) (suggesting break-up of large cases may be "much wiser"), cert.
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complexity of these trials have a detrimental impact upon the ju-
dicial system.583 A trial judge's rulings made throughout the
"mega-trial ' '54 will demand more attention and effort than
smaller, severed trials.55 In a mass trial, where there are numerous
circumstances for the judge to consider when deciding a particu-
lar issue,56 a greater likelihood for error exists, and such an error
is likely to have broad repercussions since there are multiple de-
denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 158 (discussing whether lengthy,
complex trials oppose a defendant's right to a fair trial).
"Mega-trials" are a recent development in the annals of criminal law. See Federal Bar
Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, supra note 4, at 1 (prior to 1983 only one
trial in the Second Circuit had lasted more than 65 days). The RICO Act, passed in 1970,
has contributed greatly to the proliferation of mass trials since the RICO charge is auto-
matically grounds for joinder. See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 747 (RICO conspiracy charge
gives broad joinder authority to prosecution); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903
(5th Cir.) (RICO designed to entangle even "those peripherally involved with the enter-
prise."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). See generally Note, A RICO you Can't Refuse: New
York's Organized Crime Control, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 979 (1988) (broad overview of RICO
and its inherent flaws, including lack of standing to determine if defendants should be tried
together).
83 See United States v. Agnello, 367 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("grave
problems" in trial management may be foreseen where 23 defendants are charged with
fourteen counts of conspiracy to embezzle). See generally Dawson, supra note 11, at 1385-89
(discussing difficulties related to lengthy trials).
" See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976) (trial judge must
insure jury impartiality); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (trial judge has
responsibility to protect defendant from external prejudices). See also United States v. Casa-
mento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1152 (2d Cir. 1989) (trial judge' s trial management decisions were
exemplary), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990); Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 209 (statement
of Medina, J.) (judge is powerful entity responsible for guidance of proceedings); P. WICE,
CHAOS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS 124-25
(1985) (judge responsible for aiding jury); U.S. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 65-79
(1978) (trial judge is critical figure in criminal cases).
" See United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 840 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
959 (1963). Mega-trials cause a "great problem ... [in] trial management." Id.; Gallo, 668
F. Supp. at 755. In Gallo, Chief Judge Weinstein, referring to mega-trials, stated:
The judge must .... make numerous decisions on the admissibility of evidence, and
must fashion admonitions to the jury regarding the proper limited consideration to
be accorded [to] much of the proof. The complexity and fragility of this task in such
a convoluted and prolonged case is suggested by the . ..numerous problems of
scheduling and administration.
Id. See generally U.S. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 54, at 80 (problems with
court administration); N. KERN & R. BRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (1982)
(psychological analysis of decision making process).
84 See Agueci, 310 F.2d at 840 (mass trials typically present court with large array of
difficult problems); Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755 ("The grinding tension of such a long, com-
plex case, particularly where the judge is making rulings which are continuously on the
borderline of probative force and prejudice, is debilitating."). See also supra note 11 and
accompanying text. See generally WICE, supra note 54, at 124-39 (overview of judge's role
and experiences in criminal trial).
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fendants.5 7 It follows that justice may be administered more effi-
ciently and accurately if the case was of more manageable
proportions.
As recently as ten years ago, criminal trials lasted weeks, and
only occasionally lasted several months.58 However, since the en-
actment of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act [RICO],59 conspiracy trials have increased in both size'0 and
length. 1 When a "mega-trial" appears on the docket, the judge
must be prepared to clear his calendar for an indeterminable
amount of time.62 A "mega-trial" affords little or no flexibility in
5' See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755. Chief Judge Weinstein stated:
[A]s the trial develops, it becomes increasingly difficult for the court to view objec-
tively the case and its evidentiary decisions without the added tension of avoiding
errors that might result in a mistrial or reversal. The judge knows that the court
cannot afford the time for retrial and he or she may be pressed to make decisions to
avoid that eventuality, instead of decidirg issues only as an informed trial judge's
conscience mandates.
Id.
See Weinfeld, supra note 24, at 157 (statement of Smith, J.). In 1963, there were 22
criminal jury trials lasting 20 or more trial days in the federal courts. Id. See also Federal
Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, supra note 4, at 1 (during 1974 - 1982
.only one criminal trial in Southern and Eastern Districts lasted . . . 65 trial days.
" See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). The Act makes it:
unlawful for any person who has received any income derived ... from a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person
has participated ... to use or invest .... any part of such income, . . . in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, iny enterprises which is
engaged in, or . . . affect[s], interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. at § 1962 (a).
The Supreme Court has interpreted "enterprise" as "proved by evidence of an ongoing
organization.... and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit."
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). See also United States v. Culbert, 435
U.S. 371, 377 (1978) (anti-racketeering statute sets out with precision the conduct being
criminalized). See generally Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?,
98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 614 (1985) (court faced with enforcing public interest law should
"give vent to its imagination").
60 See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 647 F. Supp. 153, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (23 defend-
ants indicted on 14 counts), affd, 880 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1989). Cf. United States v. More-
ton, 25 F.R.D. 262, 263 (W.D.N.Y. 1960) (17 defendants indicted on 2,533 counts includ-
ing 11 conspiracy counts). See generally Silver, Monitoring the Length of Criminal Trials: A
Judicial Prospective on the Problem of Controlling the Length of Criminal Trials, 12 STATE CT. J.
(1988) (discussing effects of long criminal trials on courts).
e See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1989) (three years
from indictment to verdict and seventeen months of trial), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138
(1990); United States v. Ruggiero, No. 83-412 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (indictment over 4 years old with trial still in progress).
" United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), af'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989). In Gallo, Chief Judge Weinstein, discussing
the effect of mega-trials on the courts, stated:
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a judge's scheduling, fostering inefficiency since the court must
purge its docket and reroute other cases.63 A "mega-trial" effec-
tively causes an obstruction in the caseflow of a court, which, in
light of increasing crime rates, 4 is detrimental to society and best
minimized by the use of a number of smaller trials.6 5
A criminal defendant is protected by a constitutional right to a
trial by jury. 6 In a "mega-trial", the jurors ability to act as an
If the court does decide to try the case as a whole, the judge must adjourn the
remainder of his or her civil and criminal calendars for an indefinite and protracted
period of time. The effect under the individual calendar system is ruinous. The al-
ready overburdened docket of the court reaches a breaking point, and the adminis-
tration of justice in all of the court's cases is unconscionably delayed.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Federal Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit
Courts, supra note 4, at 1 (long trials disrupt judges' calendars).
" Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755 (severed trials offer greater flexibility than do joint trials).
Judges sitting on long cases often have later cases reassigned to other judges. See United
States v. Drummond, 511 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975). In
Drummond, the case was reassigned from Judge Travia because he was presiding over
United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976), a 9
month long criminal case that charged nine defendants with 65 counts. Id. at 780 n. 1. Cf.
United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978) (trial judge was not able to
consider defendant's motion for over four months due to involvement with protracted
criminal case); SEC v. Weis Sec., Inc., 517 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1975) (judge reassigned
an application because he was too busy with a protracted criminal trial).
" See P. MCMUIGAN & R. RADER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: A BLUEPRINT 266-67 (1983)
(graphical depiction of 50% increase in crime rate between 1972 and 1981); CRIME IN
AMERICA 6-9 (B. Cohen 2d ed. 1977) (crime statistics excerpts from Time Magazine).. See
generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 33-51
(1986) (overview of rise in organized crime and effects of prosecutions).
68 See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 755. Use of smaller trials allows the court calendar to be
more easily adjusted and controlled, allowing some normalcy to remain in the court's
docket. Id. In contrast, by permitting the mega-trial to proceed, the trial judge presides
almost exclusively over a single case. Id.; Dawson, supra note 11, at 1385-86. Joint trials
"are far more difficult to schedule than individualized trials: as the number of participants
increase, it becomes harder to find a trial date" acceptable to all the participants. Id. Cf
WIcE, supra note 54, at 51, 134-35 (courts need to process large quantities of cases every-
day in order to keep pace with caseload); B. ALPER & L. NIcHoLs, BEYOND THE COURTROOM
16 (1981) (case flow management is critical issue).
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in pertinent part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury...." Id. The right to a jury trial is regarded as "indispensable protection" against
governmental tyranny. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980). The essential
feature of a jury trial is the "imposition between the accused and his accusers of the com-
mon sense judgement of a group of laymen...." Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 87 (1970)). See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (New York statute
allowing non-jury trials of offenses with maximum sentence over six months is violative of
due process). See generally BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS: THE LAW OF PUBLIC
ORDER 476-503 (1969) (comprehensive examination of jury trials and other constitutional
rights afforded to criminal defendants).
The Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), recognized that a
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intermediary between the government and the defendant is im-
paired as they become mentally and physically strained as the
months progress.67 The effect of this strain may be transferred to
the defendants, who may in turn receive an increasingly prejudi-
cial trial.6"
Although some disruption of a juror's social and economic sta-
tus is unavoidable when the length of a trial is measured in terms
of months and years rather than weeks, the effects of such a dis-
turbance may be devastating.69 It is contended that by leaving a
juror with the memory of a distressing experience, unreasonably
long trials create a reluctance on the part of some to participate in
the judicial process. Furthermore, since this juror will, in the
course of normal daily social interaction, share his experience
with others, the efficacy of the justice system will be diminished.
defendant in a joint trial may be incriminated by the admission into evidence of a code-
fendant's out of court statement, and thereby be denied 6th Amendment confrontation
rights. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137. However, if a defendant is not directly implicated by the
codefendant's out of court statement, there is no Bruton violation and severance is not
necessary. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1987) (no Bruton violation when
codefendants' confession, which is not incriminating on its face, becomes so when linked
with evidence introduced at trial). See generally Note, The Admission of a Codefendants' Con-
fession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and A Proposal for their Resolution, 1970
DUKE L.J. 329 (general discussion of joinder and severance).
67 See United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947
(1966). In Kelly, the jurors complained that the length of the trial went well beyond the
three month estimate which had been given them. Id. See also Moss, Mega-Trials, supra note
12, at 76. Jurors lose their attention in a protracted trial. Id. One defense attorney stated
that halfway through a 17 month trial he motioned for a mistrial on the ground that the
jury had been "irreparably benumbed." Id. See generally Berger, Can Juries Cope with Multi-
Month Trials?, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 449, 450 (1980) (discussing factors taken into ac-
count with respect to lay jurors in protracted trials and suggesting changes); Green, Jury
Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956).
See Kelly, 349 F.2d at 759. In Kelly, the trial length clearly affected one of the jurors
ability to remain impartial. Id. The juror was ultimately excused because "he blamed the
delay on the defendants .... Id. To compound the problem of frustration, the jury is
privy to an almost unending stream of evidence of unlawful conduct. Id. See also United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989) (excused juror harbored resent-
ment towards defendants), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138 (1990).
"o See Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 754 (seemingly endless trials work severe hardships on ju-
rors); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 841 (2d Cir. 1962) (jurors suffer "extraordi-
nary hardships" when taken away from their normal lives), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959
(1963); United States v. Alberico, 453 F. Supp. 178, 182 (D. Colo. 1977) (sequestration
grossly interferes with everyday life of jurors).
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B. Equitable Costs to the Defendants
One of the principal claims of defendants when appealing a de-
nial of severance is that their case was so complex that it over-
whelmed the jury, which became confused as to what evidence
was relevant to each defendant. 0 However, in light of the impor-
tance of the jury to our system of jurisprudence, courts consist-
ently hold that cases are not so complex as to prevent a jury from
compartmentalizing the evidence against individual defendants. 1
The ultimate test of complexity on review is "whether the jury
can separate the evidence relevant to each defendant.""2 In deter-
mining whether complexity in multi-party trials should mandate
severance, courts often consider the underlying criminal con-
70 See, e.g., United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (relative culpa-
bility of defendant may lead to jury confusion); United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881,
887-88 (2d Cir. 1968) (inability of jury to separate evidence is directly proportional to
number of counts charged), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969); United States v. Bufalino,
285 F.2d 408, 417 (2d Cir. 1960) (to believe jurors can assess and separate voluminous
evidence is "somewhat naive"); United States v. Abrams, 539 F. Supp. 378, 382-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
71 See, e.g., Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150 (mix of guilty and not guilty verdicts is some
indication of jury's ability to comprehend voluminous evidence and differentiate defend-
ants); United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 627 (2d Cir. 1977) (mixed verdicts of guilt
and innocence are indicative of ability to compartmentalize evidence), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
959 (1978); United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (appellants did
not prove prejudice from codefendants confession).
The amount of proof offered against a defendant is a consideration when ruling on a
motion for severance. See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 950 (1986). However, a defendant is "not necessarily entitled to a severance when
his alleged involvement in a conspiracy is minimal." Id. See also United States v. Vaccaro,
816 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir.) (defendant not substantially prejudiced notwithstanding rela-
tively small amount of evidence relevant to him), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 914 (1987); United
States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983) (differing levels
of proof in multi-party trials is inevitable and standing alone is insufficient to warrant sever-
ance); Dawson, supra note 11, at 1401-02.
" Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. at 81. Judge Weinfeld stated:
The ultimate question is whether, under all the circumstances of the particular case,
as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's ad-
monitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent evi-
dence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and
conduct. In sum, can the jury keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each
defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him?
Id. Even if the jury has difficulty in reaching a verdict, courts are insistent that the verdicts
are on the merits of the evidence against the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Moten,
564 F.2d 620, 627 n.9. (2d Cir. 1977) (court did not find jury confusion notwithstanding
forelady's letter to Chief Judge stating "it was impossible to reach a fair verdict. ). See
generally Berger, supra note 67.
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duct," or the number of counts charged and the number of de-
fendants being jointly tried .7 Additionally, courts often find that
any danger of confusion has been circumvented by proper jury
instructions. 75 In the wake of the extensive studies on the ability
of people in a complex environment to efficiently process informa-
tion, the traditional rationales advanced for justifying joinder are
no longer compelling when applied to modern day "mega-tri-
als". 76 A trial is an event that produces a multitude of stimuli in
the form of testimony, real and circumstantial evidence, charts,
and instructions, all of which the jury is expected to recall when
they deliberate. 7 The ability of a jury to compartmentalize and
recall relevant information is clearly dependent upon the amount
7' See, e.g., Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1150 (sales of illicit drugs are not complex transac-
tions); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 727 (2d Cir. 1965) (court found 7 counts of
securities violations against 4 defendants to be complex); United States v. Santoro, 647 F.
Supp. 153, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (RICO conspiracy is "highly technical and counter intui-
tive.") (citing Galo); United States v. Agnello, 367 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (con-
spiracy to embezzle is considered complex charge).
11 See, e.g., Abrams, 539 F. Supp. at 382 (20 counts against 5 defendants not unmanage-
able); United States v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 262, 262-63 (W.D.N.Y. 1960) (2,533 counts
against 17 defendants is "obviously" complex, resulting in substantial prejudice). But see
Agnello, 367 F. Supp. at 447 (substantial prejudice not found where 23 defendants are tried
jointly on 14 counts).
7' See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("Our theory of trial relies upon
the ability of a jury to follow instructions."). See also United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d
1197, 1201 (9th Cir.) (prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence neutralized by "careful
jury instructions."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980); United States v. Becker, 569 F.2d
951, 964 (5th Cir.) (severance is justified only if the prejudice is "beyond the curative pow-
ers of a cautionary instruction."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 865 (1978).
" See generally G. COHEN, MEMORY IN THE REAL WORLD (1989) (overview of numerous
experiments and factors involving memory). Studies focusing on environmental factors af-
fecting memory have determined that overly complex environments reduce the ability of a
person to efficiently process and integrate information. See H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER & S.
STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 31 (1967). Complexity is primarily a function
of information load, information diversity, and the rate the information is supplied to the
subject. Id. The general hypothesis is that low environmental complexity leads to boredom
and inattentiveness resulting in poor retention. Id. at 36-39. A high degree of complexity
serves to confound and confuse the subject, resulting in frustration which hampers the
ability of the subject to process information. Id. at 37-41. Moderate complexity affords the
subject a challenge that is not insurmountable. Id. See also KROLL & OGAWA, RETRIEVAL OF
THE IRRETRIEVABLE: THE EFFECTS OF SEQUENTIAL INFORMATION ON RESPONSE BIAS IN PRACTI-
CAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES 490 (1988) (discussing effects of
post-event information on memory).
" United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (jury stores relevant
evidence "in their collective mind."), affd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1083 (1989). See generally DON, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A CRITICAL INQUIRY 248
(1981) (questioning aptitude of jury to resolve legal issues).
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of information introduced,7 8 the saliency of the information, 79
and the time period between the last exposure to the information
and when it is to be recalled."0 It is contended that the test of
complexity should be: when viewing the trial as a whole, has the
defendant established a clear probability that all of the circum-
stances combine to compromise the jury's ability to determine
guilt or innocence?
Since under the rules of joinder there must be a common nexus
between the defendants," distinctions between the voluminous in-
formation put forth at trial are inherently imperceptible. 2 The
jury's task is further hindered when evidence produced at trial is
admissible against some, but not all, of the defendants.8 3 In addi-
. See DON, supra note 77, at 249 ("jurors must decipher and retain an unrealistic
amount of evidence and technical data"). See also supra note 76.
79 See HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING, supra note 76, at 27-28; E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY 25-27 (1979). "The extraordinary .... unusual, and interesting.., attract our
attention and hold our interest, both attention and interest being important aids to mem-
ory. The opposite of this principle is inversely true-routine, commonplace and insignificant
circumstances are rarely remembered .. " Id. at 27 (quoting Gardner, The Perception and
Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 394 (1933)); A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY 66 (1979) ("courts accept hypothesis that vivid images are better
retained than memories devoid of interest.").
o See LoF-rus, supra note 79, at 52. "It is by now a well-established fact that people are
less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than
after a short one." Id. at 53. As early as 1885, H. E. Ebbinghaus established what is now
called "the forgetting curve". Id. Memory, as a factor of time, decays rapidly immediately
after an event, but the rate of forgetting tends to decrease over time. Id. See also BJORK &
BJORK, ON THE ADAPTIVE ASPECTS OF RETRIEVAL FAILURE IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, IN
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES 283 (1988) (stored informa-
tion is not lost or erased, but inaccessible over time). See generally H. EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY:
A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1885) (classic empirical study of human
memory).
81 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, supra note 7.
"2 See United States v. Agnello, 367 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Where the jury
is to make findings of guilt or innocence from voluminous direct and circumstantial evi-
dence, the ability to compartmentalize is endangered. Id. Non-salient evidence is further
subject to compromise by the incorporation of later information. See LoFrUs, supra note
79, at 56-58. In an experiment, 40 subjects were shown a three minute videotape involving
the disruption of a classroom by 8 demonstrators. Id. At the conclusion of the tape, one-
half of the class was asked a question which misrepresented the number of demonstrators
as being 4, and the other half 12. Id. A week later, both groups, in response to being asked
how many intruders there were, tended to incorporate the misrepresentations in their an-
swers by compromising towards the misstated quantity. Id. It is submitted that this test, and
its results, are directly applicable to a case such as Casamento, where the jury was asked to
digest 40,000 pages of transcripts taken in the course of 17 months.
" See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defendant
named in 8 of 49 unlawful acts); United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 338 (2d Cir. 1976)
(codefendants "literally convicted themselves" by inadmissible evidence as against each
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tion to the heavy burden already confronting the jury in terms of
sheer volume, the ability of a person to efficiently recall informa-
tion decreases substantially over time." It is submitted that by the
time a "mega-trial" ends, the jury's capability to come to a ra-
tional decision on guilt or innocence is unacceptably compro-
mised.
The problem of jury confusion is further compounded by "spill-
over" prejudice. If the jury accepts the prosecutions evidence of
the charges which made joinder possible, as time passes, the jury
may associate all of the defendants with all of the criminal acts.86
This danger undermines a defendant's right to have a trial judged
on the merits.8 Guilt by association becomes a critical concern
where one defendant is a relatively minor figure in a "mega-trial",
since it often happens that this defendant must wait months
other), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977). See also Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1153 (court looks
at effect of alleged "spill-over" prejudice).
In an effort to avoid the prejudicial effects of "spill-over" prejudice, the New York Court
of Appeals recently tried a novel approach. See People v. Ricardo B., 73 N.Y.2d 228, 535
N.E.2d 1136, 538 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989). In Ricardo B., the court empaneled two juries in
order to shield one defendant from a codefendant's inculpatory statement. Id. at 232, 535
N.E.2d at 1337-38, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
" See Lorrus, supra note 79, at 25-29 (relying on R. Shepard, Recognition Memory for
Words, Sentences and Pictures, 6 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 156-63 (1967)).
Shepard tested 34 subjects for recognition of pictures after the passage of various time
lengths. Id. He found that after a two hour delay, retention was 100%, but after 4 months
retention dropped to 57%. Id. The test used a true-false answer question; therefore, the
57% is much higher than actual retention due to guessing. Id. See also supra note 80 (dis-
cussing effects of time on memory recall).
88 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). A
codefendant in a conspiracy trial is in an unenviable position, as there normally will be
evidence of criminal activity by someone. Id. "It is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds
of a feather are flocked together." Id.; United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 991 (10th
Cir. 1986) (prosecution's remarks clear attempt to prove guilt by association). See also Daw-
son, supra note 11, at 1403.
8 See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1404. Guilt by association convictions are rational deci-
sions by a jury to convict based on the evidence. Id. A steady stream of evidence tending to
prove the entire conspiracy makes it difficult to compartmentalize and thereby prejudices
peripheral defendants. United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
7 See United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 81 (1962). "To be sure .... guilt is
personal." Id. (quoting United States v. Cafaro, 26 F.R.D. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). Ide-
ally, everyone should have "a separate trial where evidence admissible only against him
would be heard by the jury." Id. But cf. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)
("[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.").
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before having a chance to present his case.88 By the time many of
the defendants have rested their case in chief, the jury may have
determined that the allegations justifying joinder are valid and
presume that all the defendants under the conspiratorial umbrella
are guilty. 89 The minor figure who has not yet put forth his case is
then put in the unenviable position of having to disprove his asso-
ciation with the conspiracy, rather than having the prosecution
prove his guilt.90
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
Certain reforms are necessary in order to re-align the current
practice of joinder with the philosophies embodied within the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. To secure the "just deter-
mination of every criminal proceeding" in light of the recent
proliferation of the "mega-trial", the presumption that joint in-
dictments lead to joint trials must be eradicated. The trial judge,
after eliciting all relevant information from the government and
defendant, would be in the best position to dletermine if joinder is
warranted. Though there can be no bright-line standard in deter-
mining whether defendants should be jointly tried, the judge
should focus primarily on the length of trial and the number of
defendants. 91 It is suggested that four months is a pivotal point in
the jury's ability to recall pertinent information.92 Therefore, it is
U See Moss, supra note 12, at 75 (ten months passed before defendant was even men-
tioned); supra notes 70-87 (discussing problems of confusion and complexity created by
mega-trials). A minor participant may be tried first, but this would cause other problems
just as likely to result in a conviction not based on the merits. See infra note 90 (discussing
problems created by incorporation of post-event information).
" See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1404-05. Since there is an inherent nexus between the
co-defendants, once a juror has heard damaging testimony against a major defendant, an-
other more minor defendant may be unfairly prejudiced before he is even involved in the
trial. Id. Cf. Lorrus, supra note 79, at 60 (suggestion of non-existent object's existence
increases likelihood that person will "remember" having seen object).
" See Dawson, supra note 11, at 1404. Defendants ordinarily have a more difficult task
in dispelling guilt when they are joined with other defendants because they have the heavy
burden of proving "non-participation in the criminal activities with the group the prosecu-
tor has defined by his joinder decisions." Id. The prosecution then enjoys an air of guilt
which diminishes the amount and quality of evidence needed to produce guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
" See supra note 20 (Casamento court created ten defendant and four month
"benchmarks").
" See supra note 84 (discussing experiments done with memory recall as a function of
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the contention of this Note that a presumption against trials that
are to last longer than four months be created. To overcome this
presumption, the government should be required to provide a
compelling reason in the interests of justice as to why the defend-
ants should be jointly tried. In any event, if the "overall" trial
time is to exceed four months, minor figures should automatically
be entitled to a separate trial.93 Since our system of jurisprudence
encompasses the idea that it is better to err on the side of inno-
cence, there is no compelling reason why minor figures should not
be severed from a large mass trial.
CONCLUSION
A "mega-trial", by its nature, defeats the primary purpose un-
derlying joinder, namely judicial economy. "Mega-trials" not only
put an unwarranted strain on judicial resources, but also subject
codefendants to a forfeiture of their right to a fundamentally fair
trial. Since the courts have created the presumption for joint tri-
als, the courts are free to change it. Trial judges must be
prompted to take affirmative steps to re-align the goals of joinder
with the realities of the modern world.
Lewis Popovski & Jody A. Rudnick
time).
" See supra notes 82-88 (discussing particularly acute prejudices regarding minor
defendants).
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